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Abstract
We propose and apply a new approach for analyzing the effects of fiscal policy
using vector autoregressions. Unlike most of the previous literature this approach
does not require that the contemporaneous reaction of some variables to fiscal
policy shocks be set to zero or need additional information, such as the timing
of wars, in order to identify fiscal policy shocks. The paper’s method is a purely
vector autoregressive approach which can be universally applied. The approach
also has the advantages that it is able to model the effects of announcements of
future changes in fiscal policy and that it is able to distinguish between the changes
in fiscal variables caused by fiscal policy shocks and those caused by business cycle
and monetary policy shocks. We apply the method to US quarterly data from
1955-2000 and obtain interesting results. Our key finding is that the best fiscal
policy to stimulate the economy is a deficit-financed tax cut and that the long term
costs of fiscal expansion through government spending are probably greater than
the short term gains.
JEL Codes: C32, E60, E62, H20,H50,H60.
Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Vector Autoregression,
Bayesian Econometrics, Agnostic identification,
Fields: Public Economics,Macroeconomics, Econometrics-Time Series.
1 Introduction
What are the effects of tax cuts on the economy? How much does it matter whether
they are financed by corresponding cuts of expenditure or by corresponding increases
in government debt, compared to the no-tax-cut scenario? These questions are of key
importance to the science of economics and the practice of policy alike. This paper aims
to answer these questions by proposing and applying a new method of identifying fiscal
policy surprises in vector autoregressions.
To understand the workings of the macro-economy, macroeconomists have often
found it useful to think of the economy as a dynamic, stochastic system, which responds
to present and past random shocks. From this perspective, vector autoregressions are
well suited as an empirical tool. A large literature has therefore successfully applied
vector autoregressions in particular to analyze the effects of monetary policy shocks.
Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) and Favero
(2001) provide excellent surveys.
Vector autoregressions analyzing fiscal policy must address the issue of how to
identify fiscal policy shocks. Most of the previous literature has identified fiscal shocks
either by making assumptions about the sluggish reaction of some variables to fiscal pol-
icy shocks, see for example Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatas and Mihov (2001a,b),
Favero (2002), and Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2004) or by using additional informa-
tion such as the timing of wars, detailed institutional information about the tax system
and detailed historical study of policy decisions or elections, see for example Romer and
Romer (1994), Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998),
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) and Eichen-
baum and Fisher (2004).1 In contrast this paper relies on macroeconomic time series
data alone for shock identification and does not rely on assumptions about the sluggish
reaction of some variables to macroeconomic shocks. Indeed it imposes no restrictions
on the responses of the key variables of interest - GDP, private consumption, private
residential and non-residential investment - to fiscal policy shocks. The approach of
this paper thus sharply differentiates it from previous studies and provides an important
complementary method of analysis which, being a purely vector autoregressive approach,
is automatically systematic and can be universally applied.
There are three main difficulties in the identification of fiscal policy shocks in a
1There are a wide variety of other empirical studies investigating the effects of fiscal policy. The
focus of this paper is on the analysis of the effects of fiscal policy using vector autoregressions and so
we do not attempt to summarize this literature here. For an excellent survey see Hemming, Kell and
Mahfouz (2000).
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vector autoregression. Firstly one needs to distinguish the movements in fiscal variables
which are caused by fiscal policy shocks from those which are simply the automatic move-
ments of fiscal variables in response to other shocks such as business cycle or monetary
policy shocks. Secondly one needs to define what one means by a fiscal policy shock.
While there is agreement that a monetary policy shock entails a surprise rise in interest
rates, several competing definitions come to mind for fiscal policy shocks. Finally one
needs to take account of the fact that there is often a lag between the announcement and
the implementation of fiscal policy and that the announcement may cause movements in
macroeconomic variables before there are movements in the fiscal variables.
This paper confronts these problems directly. To address the first problem, we
identify a business cycle shock and a monetary policy shock and require that a fiscal shock
be orthogonal to both of them. This filters out the automatic responses of macroeconomic
variables to business cycle and monetary policy shocks. To address the second we argue
that macroeconomic fiscal policy shocks exist in a two dimensional space spanned by two
basic shocks, a government revenue shock and a government spending shock. Different
fiscal policies such as balanced budget expansions can then be described as different
linear combinations of these two basic shocks.
The basic shocks are identified, following Uhlig (2005), by searching for impulses
responses that best match the characteristics of the shock as defined by a criterion
function.2 For example a basic government spending shock is simply defined as a shock
where government spending rises for a defined period after the shock. We choose to
restrict responses for a year following the shock. We regard this as a tight identifying
methodology which does not attribute all changes in government spending which are also
orthogonal to the business cycle, as shocks to fiscal policy. The methodology is designed
to rule out, for example, shocks where government spending rises on impact but then
subsequently falls after one or two quarters. However, in any case, it turns out that
the tightness of the identifying sign restrictions is not vital for the results, with weaker
identifying restrictions, where responses are only restricted on impact, yielding the same
qualitative results.
The identification procedure can also be used to address the third problem. If
2The method of identifying policy shocks using sign restrictions on impulse responses has been
introduced and applied to monetary policy in Uhlig (2005). Uhlig’s method is extended here by imposing
orthogonality restrictions to the business cycle and monetary policy shocks as well as sign restrictions.
Faust (1998) uses sign restrictions to identify monetary policy shocks, imposing them only at the time of
impact however and Canova and De Nicolo (2002, 2003) and Canova and Pina (1998) identify monetary
shocks using sign restrictions on impulse response correlations. Canova and Pappa (2003) also identify
fiscal shocks using sign restrictions on impulse response correlations but control for monetary policy
shocks by using data from economies (states and countries) belonging to monetary unions.
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there is a lag between the announcement and the implementation of the change in fiscal
policy, the identifying restrictions can easily be adapted so that, for the example of a rise
in government spending in four quarters time, the identifying restriction is simply that
government spending rises for a defined period only after the fourth quarter following
the shock.
We apply this new approach to US quarterly data, from 1955 to 2000. We use
the same definitions of government expenditure and revenue as Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) in order not to obscure the implications of our new methodological approach by
using different data definitions. Our main results are that
• a surprise deficit-financed tax cut is the best fiscal policy to stimulate the economy.
• a deficit spending shock weakly stimulates the economy.
• government spending shocks crowd out both residential and non-residential invest-
ment without causing interest rates to rise.
• controlling for the business cycle shock is important when analyzing the conse-
quences of fiscal policy.
Despite the novel methodology developed in this paper it is striking that many
of these results are similar to those of the existing literature. As with Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) we find that investment falls in response to both tax increases and gov-
ernment spending increases and that the multipliers associated with a change in taxes to
be much higher than those associated with changes in spending. With regard to private
consumption we find, in common with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Gal´ı, Lo´pez-
Salido, and Valle´s (2004), that consumption does not fall in response to an unexpected
increase in government spending. However, in contrast to these studies we do not find
that consumption rises strongly. Our results show that the response of consumption is
small and only significantly different from zero on impact and are thus more in line with
those of Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) who find that private consumption
does not change significantly in response to a positive spending shock. Our results for
consumption thus support neither the standard real business cycle model which pre-
dicts that consumption should fall nor a textbook Keynesian model which predicts that
consumption should rise following a government spending shock.3
3Theoretical explanations for why consumption does not fall in response to a government spending
shock in an infinite horizon framework are given by Devereux, Head and Lapham (1996), in a model
with increasing returns to scale, Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2004) in a model with both sticky prices
and ”Non-Ricardian” agents and Ramey and Shapiro (1998) in a model with two sectors and imperfect
inter-sectoral capital mobility.
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The paper is comprised of three main sections. Section 2 describes the identifi-
cation procedure and the VAR. The empirically identified basic shocks are presented in
section 3, while section 4 conducts policy analysis and compares the results with those
of the existing literature in section 4.6. A conclusion is in section 5. The appendix
contains additional detail, in particular on the VAR framework and the sign restriction
methodology as well as describing the data sources.
2 Identifying Fiscal Policy Shocks
A fiscal policy shock is an unpredicted change in fiscal policy. Unfortunately, there is
no such thing as a fiscal policy shock per se. Fiscal policy encompasses a wide variety
of policies: there is an endless list of types of incomes, for which the tax rules could be
changed, or categories of government spending, where changes could occur. In this paper
we address the much broader and traditional ‘macro’-economic issue of the effects on the
aggregate economy of aggregate fiscal variables. Even so there still remain a large set of
possible policies since changes in fiscal policy could, for example, be about changing the
tax-debt mix for financing a given stream of government spending, or about changing
the level of spending for a given level of debt.
In this paper we view fiscal policy shocks as existing in a two dimensional space
spanned by two basic vectors, a government revenue shock and a government spending
shock. In this set up different fiscal policy shocks can be described as different linear
combinations of these two basic shocks. For example a balanced budget expansionary
fiscal shock will simply be a linear combination of the two basic shocks such that the
increase in government spending is matched by the increase in tax revenue for a quarter
or sequence of quarters after the shock.
A recognized problem in identifying fiscal policy shocks is distinguishing genuine
fiscal policy shocks from responses of fiscal variables to business cycle movements and
monetary policy shocks. We solve this problem by also identifying a business cycle shock
and a monetary policy shock and by requiring fiscal policy shocks to be orthogonal to
both of them.
The restriction that fiscal shocks be orthogonal to the business cycle shock has
a large effect on the results, but this is very intuitive. If we would not control for the
state of the business cycle, we would end up confusing, for example, an increase in
government receipts due to a business cycle upturn with an upturn ”caused” by a tax
increase. However, the choice of requiring the business cycle shock to be causally prior
to the fiscal policy shock requires a defense. We regard it as an additional identifying
assumption beyond the sign restriction on the impulse responses of the fiscal variables,
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and as the most prudent choice. In explaining GDP movements, this assumption leaves
as much as possible to the business cycle shock. Whatever is left over is then more
plausibly an estimate of the effect of a fiscal policy shock than if we were not, or only
partially, controlling for the business cycle.
A further thorny and well-understood difficulty when identifying fiscal policy shocks
is the problem of the possible lag between the announcement and implementation of
changes in fiscal policy. Considering the potentially lengthy debates in legislatures about,
say, a reduction in tax rates, the change in government revenue is fairly predictable by
the time the tax reduction actually takes effect. Forward-looking individuals and firms
can adjust their economic choices before that date. While the tax change will happen
eventually, the surprise of a change in fiscal policy occurs earlier. The identification
procedure is easily adapted to deal with this problem by directly identifying a shock for
which there is a lag between the announcement and the implementation of the change
in fiscal policy. For example a shock where government spending rises in four quarters
time is simply defined as a shock where government spending only rises in the fourth
quarter following the shock.4
2.1 The VAR and Identifying Restrictions
We use a VAR in GDP, private consumption, total government expenditure, total govern-
ment revenue, private residential investment, private non-residential investment, interest
rate, adjusted reserves, the producer price index for crude materials and the GDP de-
flator. The VAR system consists of these 10 variables at a quarterly frequency from
1955 to 2000, has 6 lags, no constant or a time trend, and uses the logarithm for all
variables except the interest rate where we have used the level. The chosen approach
largely dictates the choice of these variables. GDP, private consumption and private
investment are included as the focus of interest. Private consumption is also included
because the consumption-GDP ratio has predictive value for GDP, as Cochrane (1994)
has shown. We split private investment into residential and non-residential investment as
the differential responses of residential versus nonresidential investment to fiscal shocks
has attracted attention in the literature, see Ramey and Shapiro (1998). The monetary
and price variables are there to identify monetary policy shocks. All the components of
national income are in real per capita terms. A more detailed description can be found
in Appendix B.
The two fiscal variables in the VAR are defined in the same way as in Blanchard
4In this respect the identified shocks resemble a type of ‘news shock’ about fiscal policy and so are
related to the shocks identified by Beaudry and Portier (2003).
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TABLE 1
IDENTIFYING SIGN RESTRICTIONS
Gov. Gov GDP, Cons, Interest Adjusted Prices
Revenue Spending Non-Res Inv Rate Reserves
Other Shocks
Business Cycle + +
Monetary Policy + - -
Basic Fiscal Policy Shocks
Government Revenue +
Government Spending +
This table shows the sign restrictions on the impulse responses for each identified shock. ‘Cons’ stands
for Private Consumption and ‘Non-Res Inv’ stands for Non-Residential Investment. A ”+” means that
the impulse response of the variable in question is restricted to be positive for four quarters following
the shock, including the quarter of impact. Likewise, a ”-” indicates a negative response. A blank entry
indicates, that no restrictions have been imposed.
and Perotti (2002). Thus total government expenditure is total government consumption
plus total government investment and total government revenues is total government tax
revenues minus transfers. Netting out transfer payments from the government revenue
variable is a non-trivial decision, but we have chosen to use Blanchard and Perotti’s
(2002) data definitions in order to emphasize the implications of the new identification
technique rather than have the results obscured by using different data definitions.
2.2 The identifying assumptions in detail.
An overview of our identifying sign restrictions on the impulse responses is provided in
Table 1. A business cycle shock is defined as a shock which jointly moves output, con-
sumption, non-residential investment and government revenue in the same direction for
four quarters following the shock. Such a co-movement is consistent with both demand
and supply side shocks and hence the approach remains ‘agnostic’ on the issue of the
determinants of business cycle fluctuations. The restriction that government revenues in-
crease with output in the business cycle shock should be emphasized. This is our crucial
identifying assumption for fiscal policy shocks: when output and government revenues
move in the same direction, we essentially assume that this must be due to some improve-
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ment in the business cycle generating the increase in government revenue, not the other
way around. We regard this is a reasonable assumption and consistent with a number
of theoretical views. Furthermore, our identifying assumptions are close to minimalistic:
some assumptions are needed to say anything at all. Obviously, the orthogonality as-
sumption a priori excludes the view that positive co-movements of government revenues
and output are caused by some form of ‘Laffer Curve’ or ’fiscal consolidation’ effect from
a surprise rise in taxes.5
A monetary policy shock moves interest rates up and reserves and prices down for
four quarters after the shock. These identifying restrictions are close to those used in
Uhlig (2005). We also require the monetary policy shock to be orthogonal to the busi-
ness cycle shock. The main purpose of characterizing the business cycle and monetary
shocks is to filter out the effects of these shocks on the fiscal variables. The additional
orthogonalization among these two shocks has no effect on that.
Fiscal policy shocks are identified only through restricting the impulse responses
of the fiscal variables and through the requirement that they are orthogonal to both
business cycle shocks as well as monetary policy shocks. As stated above we identify two
basic fiscal shocks, a ”government spending shock” and a ”government revenue shock”,
employing tight identifying restrictions where the responses of the fiscal variables are
restricted for a year after shock. For example a basic government spending shock is
simply defined as a shock where government spending rises for a defined period after
the shock. These tight restrictions are designed to rule out very transitory shocks to
fiscal variables where for example, government spending rises on impact but falls after
one or two quarters. Nonetheless we have checked that our results are robust to weaker
identifying restrictions where responses are only restricted on impact. Finally it should
be noted that we do not restrict the behavior of government revenue when identifying
the government spending shock or vice versa. This is because it is not necessary since
all that is required to describe the two dimensional space of fiscal policy shocks are
two linearly independent vectors. However it is possible to place restrictions on these
shocks so that for example government revenue’s response to a government spending
shock is initially zero. An example of such restrictions are the year delayed fiscal shocks
in Figures 4 and 6 where fiscal responses are restricted to be zero for a year following
the announcement of the shock. Implementation of these zero restrictions is described
in Appendix A and in Mountford and Uhlig (2002).
5Such effects have been investigated by a number of authors notably Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano
(1990, 2000) and Perotti (1999).
7
2.2.1 Making it precise
The implementation of the identification method for the basic fiscal shocks described
above involves identifying multiple orthogonal shocks which are each identified using
sign restrictions. Details on the methodology and terminology are given in Appendix A,
where we also define an impulse vector and introduce the new concept of an impulse
matrix. In this subsection, we just outline the key steps.
A VAR in reduced form is given by
Yt =
L∑
i=1
BiYt−i + ut , t = 1, ....T, E[utu′t] = Σ
where Yt are m × 1 vectors, L is the lag length of the VAR, Bi are m × m coefficient
matrices and ut is the one step ahead prediction error. Let A˜ be the lower triangular
Cholesky factor of Σ.6 Any shock or impulse vector, a, can be written as, a = A˜q, where
q are the identifying weights which are to be determined and where, q = [q1, . . . , qm],
|| q ||= 1. Let ra(k) be the m dimensional impulse response at horizon k to the impulse
vector a. This can be written as
ra(k) =
m∑
i=1
qiri(k) (1)
see equation (3) in Appendix A.
To impose the identifying sign restrictions we proceed as follows. Appendix A
defines the penalty function f , defined on the real line. We solve for the weights q and
thus a = A˜q by solving the minimization problem
q = argminΨ(A˜q) (2)
where the criterion function Ψ(a) is given by
Ψ(a) =
∑
j²JS,+
K∑
k=0
f(−rja(k)
sj
) +
∑
j²JS,−
K∑
k=0
f(
rja(k)
sj
)
The criterion function thus sums penalties over the periods k = 0, . . . K following the
shock and over the indices of variables with positive (JS,+ ) and negative (JS,−) sign
restrictions, respectively. The impulse responses are normalized by the standard error
6We do not use the Cholesky factorization for identification. Appendix A shows that it only serves
as a useful computational tool, and any other factorization for these calculations would deliver the same
results.
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sj of variable j. The penalty function is minimized subject to any orthogonality restric-
tions. The choice of penalty function is to some degree arbitrary, however Uhlig (2005)
shows that alternative ‘loss-function-free’ approaches, such as randomly drawing poten-
tial shock vectors and discarding those that do not obey the sign restrictions, produce
similar results. The results are also robust to changes in the specification of the penalty
function.
Following Uhlig (2005), we use a Bayesian VAR methodology, taking a number of
draws from the posterior, and identifying the shocks for each draw.
3 Results
The impulse responses for the fundamental shocks can be seen in Figures 1 through 6,
where we have plotted the impulse responses of all our 10 variables to the shocks. The
Figures plot the 16th, 50th and 84th quantiles of these impulse responses, calculated at
each horizon between 0 and 24 quarters after the shocks. The impulses restricted by the
identifying sign restrictions are identified by the shaded area in the figures.
3.1 The Business Cycle Shock
The impulse responses of the business cycle shock are plotted in Figure 1. In response
to the business cycle shock, output, consumption, non-residential investment and gov-
ernment revenue increase in the first four quarters by construction. Given that no re-
striction is placed on these responses after four periods, it is notable that all of these
responses are persistent. Government revenues increase approximately twice as much in
percentage terms as GDP. There is no contradiction here, provided marginal tax rates
are approximately twice average tax rates. The persistence in the non-residential invest-
ment variable indicates that a business cycle shock may increase the steady state capital
to labor ratio and so generate a higher level of steady state income, consumption and
government revenue. It must be stressed that these responses are consistent with both
demand and supply side explanations of the business cycle and this paper is agnostic on
the issue of the relative importance and persistence of demand and supply shocks.
The responses of the monetary variables and the government spending variable
to the business cycle shock were not restricted at all by the identification method and
their responses are quite interesting. The interest rate rises and the adjusted reserves
fall in response to a positive business cycle shock. This could be caused by a systematic
counter-cyclical response of monetary policy over the sample period, which fits with the
description of monetary policy given by Romer and Romer (1994). The fall in adjusted
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reserves (compared to the no-business-cycle-shock scenario) would indicate that this
counter-cyclical response is rather strong.
Government expenditures in contrast do not behave in a counter-cyclical fashion.
Rather they increase, slowly, with a positive business cycle shock. Thus if a business
cycle boom fills the government’s coffers with cash, it will spend more eventually. Note
again that, following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we chose the government expendi-
ture variable to be government consumption and investment in order to isolate changes
in government expenditure from automatic changes over the business cycle. Thus the
government expenditure variable does not include transfer payments which almost surely
would automatically vary counter-cyclically.
3.2 The Monetary Policy Shock
The response to a monetary policy shock is shown in Figure 2. Note that we have
constructed the monetary policy shock to be orthogonal to the business cycle shock shown
in Figure 1. Thus this shock represents that part of the unanticipated quarterly change
in monetary policy that is not accounted for by systematic responses over the quarter
to unanticipated business cycle shocks. A consequence of our identification strategy is
that if, rather counter-intuitively, monetary policy shocks should be such that surprise
rises in the interest rate cause increases in output, consumption and investment, then
these effects would be captured by the business cycle shock shown in Figure 1, not by
the monetary shock shown here. Thus, output, consumption and investment in Figure
2, have a propensity to fall almost by construction and they do, although interestingly
by very little.
The results here are consistent with the conventional view that a surprise rise in
the interest rate leads to reductions in output, investment and consumption. The results
are also not inconsistent with the findings in Uhlig (2005): there, without orthogonality
to the business cycle shock, sign restriction methods do not deliver a clear direction for
real GDP in response to a surprise rise in interest rates. What is a little surprising is
the rise in government revenue in response to the rise in interest rates. One plausible,
although not the only, explanation for this is that over the sample period, monetary and
fiscal policy was coordinated so that a monetary tightening was accompanied by a fiscal
tightening via an increase in taxes. If this were the case then there would be a danger
that requiring fiscal shocks to be orthogonal to monetary policy shocks will cause biases
in the results. For this reason we have checked the robustness of our identified fiscal
shocks by identifying them both second (orthogonal to only the business cycle shock)
and third (orthogonal to both the business cycle and monetary policy shocks). We find
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for all the fiscal shocks that the responses of the real variables are very similar in both
these specifications and hence any bias is small. This may simply be because monetary
policy shocks do not appear have a large effect on real macroeconomic variables. We
conclude from this, that controlling for the monetary policy shock is not important when
analyzing the consequences of fiscal policy, see Mountford and Uhlig (2002) for a greater
discussion of this issue.
3.3 The Basic Government Revenue Shock
A basic government revenue shock is identified as a shock that is orthogonal to the
business cycle and monetary policy shock and where government revenue rises for a year
after the shock. The impulse responses for this shock are displayed in Figure 3. We also
identify a year delayed shock where government revenue is restricted to rise only after a
year. The responses of this shock are displayed in Figure 4.
Figure 3 shows that the responses of the real variables of interest to a standard
government revenue shock are intuitive. GDP, consumption and residential investment
fall in response to an increase in revenue and nonresidential investment falls as well
although with a lag. The responses of interest rates and prices are less intuitive as interest
rates rise and reserves fall in response to a rise in revenue. Although no restriction is
placed on the behavior of government spending for this shock, government spending
initially does not change. However in the medium term it follows the shape of the GDP
and consumption responses and falls before recovering.
The responses to the year delayed basic revenue shock are displayed in Figure
4. They show that an anticipated rise in revenues immediately depresses output and
consumption. Interest rates fall with this drop in output and this stimulates residential
investment. After the implementation of the increase in revenues the responses look
similar to those in Figure 3.
Finally it should be noted that we have checked that our results are robust to
employing the weaker identifying restrictions where government revenue is only restricted
to be positive on impact.
3.4 The Basic Government Spending Shock
A basic government spending shock is identified as a shock that is orthogonal to the
business cycle and monetary policy shock and where government spending rises for a
year after the shock. The impulse responses for this shock are displayed in Figure 5.
We also identify a year delayed shock where government spending is restricted to rise
only after a year. The responses of this shock are displayed in Figure 6.
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Figure 5 shows that the basic government spending shock stimulates output during
the first four quarters although only weakly and has only a very weak effect on private
consumption. It also reduces both residential and non-residential investment, although
interestingly not via higher interest rates. Although no restriction is placed on the
behavior of government revenue this does not change very significantly and so the basic
government spending shock will resemble a fiscal policy shock of deficit spending, whose
responses are displayed in Figure 7 in section 4 below. The response of prices to the
increase in government spending is a little puzzling since both the GDP deflator and
the producer price index for crude materials show a decline. Although this is a counter-
intuitive result, it should also be noted that this negative relationship between prices and
government spending has also been found in other studies, see for example Canova and
Pappa (2003), Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) and Fata´s, and Mihov (2001a).
The responses to the year delayed basic government spending shock are displayed
in Figure 6. They show that an anticipated rise in spending has a marginally positive
announcement effect on output and consumption. Interest rates rise with this announce-
ment effect which contracts residential investment. Interpretation of the responses in
the medium term are clouded by the significant cut in taxes after a year which from
Figure 3 have a significant expansionary effect. In section 4.1 below we demonstrate a
straightforward method for accounting for such changes when performing policy analysis.
As with the basic government revenue shock we have checked that these results are
robust to the employment of weaker identifying restrictions where government spending
is only restricted to be positive on impact.
4 Policy Analysis
We can use the basic shocks identified in the previous section to analyze the effects of
different fiscal policies. We view different fiscal policy shocks as different linear combina-
tions of the basic fiscal policy shocks. There are clearly a huge number of possible fiscal
policies we could analyze so here we restrict ourselves to comparing three popularly an-
alyzed fiscal policies. A deficit spending shock, a deficit financed tax cut and a balanced
budget spending shock. We first detail how the impulse responses for these policies are
generated
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4.1 Calculating the Impulse Responses for Different Fiscal Poli-
cies
Our methodology regards different fiscal policies as simply being different combinations of
the two basic shocks. Thus for example a government spending shock where government
spending is raised by 1% for four quarters while government revenue remains unchanged
is just the linear combination of the sequence of the two basic shocks that causes these
impulse responses in the fiscal variables. More formally denoting rj,a(k) as the response
at horizon k of variable j to the impulse vector a then the above policy requires that
0.01 =
k∑
j=0
(rGS,BGS(k − j)BGSj + rGS,BGR(k − j)BGRj) for k = 0, . . . K
0 =
k∑
j=0
(rGR,BGS(k − j)BGSj + rGR,BGR(k − j)BGRj) for k = 0, . . . K
where K = 4, GS and GR stand for Government Expenditure and Government Revenue
and BGSj,and BGRj are respectively the scale of the standard basic government spending
and revenue shocks in period j.
This simple methodology is easily adapted to deal with more complicated fiscal
policies or to allow for the effects of the anticipation of future fiscal changes. For example
for the latter effect one just has to identify the basic shocks delayed by j periods for
j = 1, . . . K and substitute appropriately into the above formula.
4.2 A Deficit Spending Fiscal Policy Shock
The impulse responses for a deficit spending fiscal policy shock are shown in Figure 7.
The shock is designed so that government spending rises by 1% and tax revenues remain
unchanged for four quarters following the shock. As noted above the standard basic
government spending shock does not change tax revenues significantly so the impulses
in Figure 7 and are very similar to those in Figure 5. Thus the deficit spending shock
stimulates output and consumption during the first four quarters although only weakly, it
reduce both residential and non-residential investment and it produces a counterintuitive
response for prices.
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TABLE 2
PRESENT VALUE MULTIPLIERS OF THE POLICY SHOCKS
1 qrt 4qrts 8 qrts 12 qrts 20 qrts Maximum
DEFICIT FINANCED TAX CUT 0.20 0.53 2.08 6.19 3.80 9.59 (qrt 14)
DEFICIT SPENDING 0.44 0.31 0.37 0.29 0.33 0.44 (qrt 1)
This table shows the present value multipliers for a deficit financed tax cut policy shock and for a deficit
spending fiscal policy shock. The multipliers given are the median multipliers in both cases.
4.3 A Deficit Financed Tax Cut Fiscal Policy Shock
The impulse responses for a deficit financed tax cut fiscal policy shock are shown in
Figure 8. The shock is designed so that tax revenues fall by 1% and government spending
remains unchanged for four quarters following the shock. The responses look very similar
to a mirror image of the responses to the basic government revenue shock in Figure 3.
Thus the tax cut stimulates output, consumption and investment significantly with the
effect peaking after about three years. The effect on prices is initially negative but
subsequently positive following the rise in output.
4.4 The Balanced Budget Spending Shock
The balanced budget spending shock is identified by requiring both government revenues
and expenditures to increase in such a way that the increase in revenues and expenditure
are equal for each period in the four-quarter window following the shock. For ease of
comparison we choose a rise in government spending of 1% and a rise in government
revenues of 1.28%. Government revenue rises by more than government spending since
over the sample government revenue’s share of GDP is 0.162 while that of government
spending is 0.208 thus we require government revenues to rise by (0.208/0.162)%. The
results are shown in Figure 9. These show that on impact there is a small expansionary
effect on GDP but thereafter the depressing effects of the tax increases dominate the
spending effects and GDP, consumption and investment falls.
4.5 Measures of the Effects of Policy Shocks
To compare the effects of one fiscal shock with another it is useful to define summary
measures of the effects of each fiscal shock. One measure used in the literature is the
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ratio of the response of GDP at a given period to the initial movement of the fiscal
variable, see for example Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Canova and Pappa (2003).
We refer to this as the impact multiplier. We report the impact multipliers of the deficit
financed tax cut and deficit spending policy shocks below in Tables 3 and 4.
However we also think a measure of the impact of a shock along the entire path
of the responses up to a given period is also useful. In Figure 10 we have therefore
plotted the present value of the impulse responses of GDP and the fiscal variables for the
deficit financed tax cut and the deficit spending policy shocks. We have also calculated
a present value multiplier for these shocks which we display in Table 2. To calculate the
present value multiplier we use the following formula.
Present Value Multiplier at lag k =
∑k
j=0(1 + i)
−jyj∑k
j=0(1 + i)
−jfj
1
f/y
where yj is the response of GDP at period j, fj is the response of the fiscal variable at
period j, i is the average interest rate over the sample, and f/y is the average share of
the fiscal variable in GDP over the sample. We use the median multiplier in all cases.
Table 2 and Figure 10 and tell the same story. They show that in present value
terms tax cuts have a much greater effect on GDP than government spending. The
present value of the GDP response to a deficit spending shock becomes insignificant
after two years whereas that for the deficit financed tax cut is significantly positive
throughout. Figure 10 also shows that the standard error of the present value multiplier
for some periods may be very large for the deficit financed tax cut. This is because
the present value of the tax cuts is close to zero for some periods, implying very large
multipliers, for a large part of the distribution. It should be noted therefore that Table
2 presents the median of the multipliers and not the multiplier of the median responses.
4.6 Comparison of Results With The Existing Literature
Despite the novel methodology used in this paper, what is immediately striking about the
results is their similarity, in many respects, to those of the existing literature. There are
however also important differences which we discuss below. As we have used Blanchard
and Perotti’s (2002) data definitions for the fiscal variables and use a very similar sample
period it is natural to compare our results most closely with their paper. We do this in
the following subsection. We compare our results to other studies in a further subsection.
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TABLE 3
IMPACT MULTIPLIERS OF DEFICIT FINANCED TAX CUT POLICY SHOCK
1 qrt 4qrts 8 qrts 12 qrts 20 qrts Maximum
Mountford and Uhlig
GDP 0.19 1.21 2.79 3.22 1.32 3.23 (qrt 11)
TAX REVENUES -1.00 -1.00 0.29 0.94 0.06
GOV SPENDING 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.65 0.39
Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
GDP 0.70 1.07 1.32 1.30 1.29 1.33 (qrt 7)
TAX REVENUES -0.74 -0.31 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16
GOV SPENDING 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.20 0.20
This table shows the impact multipliers for a deficit financed tax cut fiscal shock for various quar-
ters after the shock and compares them to similar measures from Blanchard and Perotti (2002) Ta-
ble III. The multiplier represents the effect in dollars of a one dollar cut in taxes at the first quar-
ter. For the Mountford and Uhlig results this is calculated with the formula: multiplier for GDP
= GDP responseInitial Fiscal shock/(Average Fiscal variable share of GDP), where the median responses are used
in all cases. On the calculation of the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) multipliers see Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) section V.
4.6.1 Comparison With Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
The impact multipliers, defined above, are compared with those of Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) in Tables 3 and 4.
For the deficit financed tax cut, Table 3 shows that our results are very comparable
with Blanchard and Perotti’s. In both studies the effect on output of a change in tax
revenues is persistent and large. The size of the impact multiplier is greater in our results
than in Blanchard and Perotti’s although in both studies the impact multipliers of the
tax cut shock are greater than those of the spending shock.
For the spending shock, Table 4 shows that size of the impact multipliers associated
with increased government spending are smaller than Blanchard and Perotti’s, but that
the timing has a similar pattern in the sense that the largest impact multipliers are in
the periods close to the impact of the shock and with the responses after a year being
insignificant.
With respect to the responses of investment again the two studies are similar.
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TABLE 4
IMPACT MULTIPLIERS OF A DEFICIT SPENDING POLICY SHOCK
1 qrt 4qrts 8 qrts 12 qrts 20 qrts Maximum
Mountford and Uhlig
GDP 0.44 0.42 0.67 0.23 -0.08 0.52 (qrt 6)
GOV SPENDING 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.51 0.07
TAX REVENUES 0.00 0.00 -0.14 -0.08 -0.67
Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
GDP 0.90 0.55 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.90 (qrt 1)
GOV. SPENDING 1.00 1.30 1.56 1.61 1.62
TAX REVENUES 0.10 0.18 0.33 0.36 0.37
This table shows the impact multipliers for a deficit spending fiscal shock for various quarters af-
ter the shock and compares them to similar measures from Blanchard and Perotti (2002) Table IV.
The multiplier represents the effect in dollars of a one dollar increase in spending at the first quar-
ter. For the Mountford and Uhlig results this is calculated with the formula: multiplier for GDP
= GDP responseInitial Fiscal shock/(Average Fiscal variable share of GDP), where the median responses are used
in all cases. On the calculation of the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) multipliers see Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) section V.
In both Blanchard and Perotti’s and in our study investment falls in response to both
tax increases and government spending increases. As Blanchard and Perotti, argue this
finding is difficult to reconcile with the standard Keynesian approach.
With regard to consumption the results have some similarities to Blanchard and
Perotti’s in that consumption does not fall in response to a spending shock. However in
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) consumption rises significantly in response to a spending
shock whereas in our analysis consumption does not move by very much.7 As Figure 7
shows consumption’s response is only significantly positive on impact and then by only a
small amount. Thereafter its response is insignificant. Our results for consumption thus
support neither the standard real business cycle model which predicts that consumption
should fall following a government spending shock or a textbook Keynesian model which
predicts that consumption should rise.
7See also Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2004) who also find a significantly positive consumption
response.
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4.6.2 Comparison With Other Studies
With regard to other studies in the literature not only are there differences in method-
ology but also in the definitions of the fiscal variables. There is thus no shortage of
potential sources for differences in results. Nevertheless there is still some common
ground in the results of this paper and previous work. For example consider the recent
work by Burnside,Eichenbaum and Fisher (2003) which builds on the work of Ramey
and Shapiro (1998), and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998) in using changes in
military purchases associated with various wars to identify government spending shock.
They find that private consumption does not change significantly in response to a gov-
ernment spending shock. However in contrast to our results they find that investment
has an initial, transitory positive response to the spending shock.
With regard to the movement of investment, our result that residential investment
falls in response to an increase in government spending is also found by Ramey and
Shapiro (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998). However these studies do
not find that non-residential investment is also crowded out.
4.7 Variance of the Policy Analysis
Clearly there is a considerable degree of uncertainty in the numbers displayed in Tables
3 and 4, as they are simply based on the maximum multipliers from the median impulse
responses. An advantage of the Bayesian approach used in our analysis is that it naturally
provides a measure of the standard errors for this policy analysis. Standard errors
can easily be calculated for each policy shock by taking the maximum and minimum
multipliers of GDP and their corresponding lag for each of the draws from the posterior.
These maxima and minima can then be ordered and the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles
reported. This is done in Table 5.
Table 5 supports the conclusions above. The maximum expansionary effect of a
deficit spending shock is much below that of the tax revenue shock. Indeed the upper
confidence limit of the deficit spending shock is below the lower confidence limit of the
tax cut shock. For the tax cut the maximum effects are significantly positive and the
minimum effects are insignificantly different from zero.
The results in Table 5 are usefully related to the impulse responses in Figures 7
through 9. For the tax cut, the minimum multipliers are all on impact and are insignif-
icant, while the maximum multipliers occur after two or more years, whereas for the
balanced budget and deficit spending shocks the maximum effects occur at short lags
and the minimum effects at longer lags. Since the variance of the impulse responses for
these shocks appears to increase at longer lag lengths, we also look at the maximum
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TABLE 5
MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM IMPACT MULTIPLIERS OF FISCAL POLICY SHOCKS
Fiscal Shock Maximum Multiplier Minimum Multiplier
Median Confidence Interval Median Confidence Interval
Multiplier 16th,84th Quantiles Multiplier 16th,84th Quantiles
Deficit Spending 1.36 0.75, 1.59 -0.73 -2.73, -0.22
lag 9 lag 1, lag 24 at lag 24 lag 24, lag 5
Balanced Budget 0.45 0.18, 1.59 -3.64 -6.39, -2.26
lag 3 lag 1, lag 24 at lag 11 lag 23, lag 8
Tax Cut 3.45 3.11, 4.65 -0.11 -0.40, 0.28
lag 13 lag 9, lag 14 at lag 1 lag 1, lag 1
Deficit Spending 0.71 0.56, 0.89 0.03 -0.25, 0.17
In first year lag 4 lag 4, lag 4 at lag 3 lag 4, lag 1
Balanced Budget 0.31 0.05, 0.71 -0.83 -1.39, -0.60
In first year at lag 1 lag 4, lag 1 at lag 1 lag 4, lag 2
These statistics relate to the distribution of the maximum and minimum impact multiplier ef-
fects of each fiscal shock. For each draw the maximum and minimum fiscal multiplier is cal-
culated and the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles of these results are displayed. The multiplier
statistic is calculated in terms of the initial, lag 0, fiscal shock as follows: multiplier for GDP
= GDP responseFiscal shock at Lag 0/(Average Fiscal variable share of GDP).
and minimum multipliers of the two spending shocks in the first year after the shock.
In this case we now get the result that the deficit spending shock’s minimum multiplier
is insignificantly different from zero but that for the balanced budget spending shock is
still significantly negative.
4.8 Policy Conclusions
An important lesson one can draw from the results is that while a deficit-financed ex-
penditure stimulus is possible, the eventual costs are likely to be much higher than the
immediate benefits. For suppose that government spending is increased by two percent,
financed by increasing the deficit: this results, using the median values from Table 5,
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at maximum, in less than a three percent increase in GDP. But the increased deficit
needs to be repaid eventually with a hike in taxes. Even ignoring compounded interest
rates, this would require a tax hike of over two percent.8 This tax hike results in a seven
percent drop in GDP. Thus unless the policy maker’s discount rate is very high the costs
of the expansion will be much higher than the initial benefit.
This general line of reasoning is consistent with the balanced budget spending shock
whose impulses are shown in Figure 9. This shows that when government spending is
financed contemporaneously that the contractionary effects of the tax increases outweigh
the expansionary effects of the increased expenditure after a very short time.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a new approach for distinguishing the effects of fiscal
policy shocks by adapting the method of Uhlig (2005). This method uses only the in-
formation in the macroeconomic time series of the vector autoregression together with
minimal assumptions to identify fiscal policy shocks. In particular it imposes no re-
strictions on the responses of the key variables of interest - GDP, private consumption,
private residential and non-residential investment - to fiscal policy shocks. The paper
applied this approach using post war data on the US economy.
We have analyzed three types of policy shocks: a deficit financed spending increase,
a balanced budget spending increase (financed with higher taxes) and a deficit financed
tax cut, in which revenues increase but government spending stays unchanged. We found
that a deficit spending shock stimulates the economy for the first 4 quarters but only
weakly compared to that for a deficit financed tax cut. We also found that both types
of spending shock had the effect of crowding out investment.
Although the best fiscal policy for stimulating the economy appears to be deficit-
financed tax cuts, we wish to point out that this should not be read as endorsing them.
This paper only points out that unanticipated deficit-financed tax cuts work as a (short-
lived) stimulus to the economy, not that they are sensible. The resulting higher debt
burdens may have long-term consequences which are far worse than the short-term in-
crease in GDP, and surprising the economy may not be good policy in any case. These
normative judgements require theoretical models for which the empirical positive results
in this paper can provide a useful starting point.
Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 OEX, U.K.
8For simplicity we are assuming the tax hike to be a surprise, when it occurs, which allows us to use
the results above.
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APPENDIX
A VARs and impulse matrices
A VAR in reduced form is given by
Yt =
L∑
i=1
BiYt−i + ut , t = 1, ....T, E[utu′t] = Σ
where Yt are m × 1 vectors, L is the lag length of the VAR, Bi are m × m coefficient
matrices and ut is the one step ahead prediction error.
The problem of identification is to translate the one step ahead prediction errors,
ut, into economically meaningful, or ‘fundamental’, shocks, vt. We adopt the common
assumptions in the VAR literature that there are m fundamental shocks, which are mu-
tually orthogonal and normalized to be of variance 1. Thus E[vtv
′
t] = Im. Identification
of these shocks amounts to identifying a matrix A, such that ut = Avt and AA
′ = Σ. The
jth column of A represents the immediate impact, or impulse vector, of a one standard
error innovation to the jth fundamental innovation, which is the jth element of v. The
following definition is useful, and new.
Definition 1 An impulse matrix of rank n is a n × m sub-matrix of some m × m
matrix A, such that AA′ = Σ. An impulse vector a is an impulse matrix of rank 1,
i.e. is a vector a ∈ Rm such that there exists some matrix A, where a is a column of A,
such that AA′ = Σ.
One can show that the identification does not depend on the particular matrix A
chosen beyond a given impulse matrix, i.e. a given impulse matrix uniquely identifies
the fundamental shocks corresponding to it:
Theorem 1 Suppose that Σ is regular. Let a given impulse matrix [a(1), . . . , a(n)] of size
n be a submatrix of two m×m matrices A, A˜ with AA′ = A˜A˜′ = Σ. Let vt = A−1ut, v˜t =
A˜−1ut and let v
(1)
t , . . . , v
(n)
t resp. v˜
(1)
t , . . . , v˜
(n)
t be the entries in vt resp. v˜t corresponding
to a(1), . . . , a(n), i.e., if e.g. a(1) is the third column of A, then v
(1)
t is the third entry of
vt. Then, v
(i)
t = v˜
(i)
t for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof: W.l.o.g., let [a(1), . . . , a(n)] be the first n columns of A and A˜. If this is e.g.
not the case for A and if e.g. a(1) is the third column of A, one can find a permutation
matrix P so that the given impulse matrix will be the first n columns of Aˆ = AP with
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a(1) the first column of Aˆ. Since PP ′ = I, AˆAˆ′ = Σ. Furthermore, the first column of P
is the vector e3, which is zero except for a 1 in its third entry: hence the first entry of
Aˆ−1ut = P ′vt must be the third entry of vt and thus be v
(1)
t corresponding to a
(1).
With [a(1), . . . , a(n)] as the first n columns of A and A˜, let En = [In, 0n,m]. Note
that [v
(1)
t , . . . , v
(n)
t ]
′ = EnA−1ut. We need to show that EnA−1ut = EnA˜−1ut for all ut.
It suffices to show that EnA
−1Σ = EnA˜−1Σ, since Σ is regular. But this follows from
EnA
−1Σ = EnA−1AA′
= EnA
′
= [a(1), . . . , a(n)]′
= EnA˜
−1A˜A˜′
= EnA˜
−1Σ
•
In the VAR literature identification usually proceeds by identifying allm fundamen-
tal shocks and so characterizing the entire A matrix. This requires imposing m(m−1)/2
restrictions on the A matrix. This is done either by assuming a recursive ordering of
variables in the VAR, so that a Cholesky decomposition of A can be used, see Sims
(1986), or by imposing the m(m − 1)/2 restrictions via assumed short run structural
relationships as in Bernanke (1986) and Blanchard and Watson(1986), via assumed long
run structural relationships, as in Blanchard and Quah (1989) or via both assumed short
run and long run structural relationships as in Gali (1992).
This paper instead extends the method of Uhlig (2005) and identifies at most three
fundamental shocks and so needs to characterize an impulse matrix [a(1), a(2), a(3)] of rank
3 rather than all of A. This is accomplished by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse
responses. Note that by construction, the covariance between the fundamental shocks
v
(1)
t , v
(2)
t and v
(3)
t corresponding to a
(1), a(2) and a(3) is zero, i.e. that these fundamental
shocks are orthogonal.
To that end, note that any impulse matrix [a(1), . . . , a(n)] can be written as the
product [a(1), . . . , a(n)] = A˜Q of the lower triangular Cholesky factor A˜ of Σ with an
n × m matrix Q = [q(1), . . . , q(n)] of orthonormal rows q(i), i.e. QQ′ = In: this follows
from noting that A˜−1A must be an orthonormal matrix for any decomposition AA′ = Σ
of Σ. Likewise, Let a = a(s), s ∈ {1, . . . , n} be one of the columns of the impulse matrix
and q = q(s) = A˜−1a(s) be the corresponding column of Q: note that q(s) does not depend
on the other a(p), p 6= s. As in Uhlig (2005), it follows easily that the impulse responses
for the impulse vector a can be written as a linear combination of the impulse responses
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to the Cholesky decomposition of Σ as follows. Define rji(k) as the impulse response
of the jth variable at horizon k to the ith column of A˜, and the m dimensional column
vector ri(k) as [r1i(k), ..., rmi(k)]. Then the m dimensional impulse response ra(k) at
horizon k to the impulse vector a(s) is given by
ra(k) =
m∑
i=1
qiri(k) (3)
(where qi is the i-th entry of q = q
(s)), delivering equation (1).
Define the function f on the real line per f(x) = 100x if x ≥ 0 and f(x) = x
if x ≤ 0. Let sj be the the standard error of variable j. Let JS,+ be the index set of
variables, for which identification of a given shock restricts the impulse response to be
positive and let JS,− be the index set of variables, for which identification restricts the
impulse response to be negative. To impose the additional identifying inequality sign
restrictions beyond the zero restrictions of equation (5), we solve
a = argmina= eAqΨ(a) (4)
where the criterion function Ψ(a) is given by
Ψ(a) =
∑
j²JS,+
3∑
k=0
f(−rja(k)
sj
) +
∑
j²JS,−
3∑
k=0
f(
rja(k)
sj
)
Computationally, we implement this minimization, using a simplex algorithm: it is avail-
able on many statistical packages as e.g. MATLAB and RATS; for this paper we use
the version of the algorithm written in GAUSS by Bo Honore and Ekaterini Kyriazidou,
available from http://www.princeton.edu/ honore/.
Note that ‘zero’ restrictions, where the impulse responses of the j-th variable to an
impulse vector a for, say, the first four periods are set to zero, can simply be incorporated
into the analysis. These restrictions can be written as a restriction on the vector q that
0 = Rq (5)
where R is a 4×m matrix of the form
R =
 rj1(0) · · · rjm(0)... . . . ...
rj1(3) · · · rjm(3)
 (6)
To identify an impulse matrix [a(1), a(2)], where the first shock is a business cycle
shock and the second shock is a fiscal policy shock, first identify the business cycle shock
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a(1) = A˜q(1) in the manner described above and then identify the second shock a(2) by
replacing the minimization problem 4 with
a = argmina= eAq,Rq=0,q′q(1)=0Ψ(a) (7)
i.e. by additionally imposing orthogonality to the first shock. The two restrictions
Rq = 0, q′q(1) = 0 can jointly be written as
0 = R˜q (8)
where R˜′ = [q(1), R′]. Likewise, if orthogonality to two shocks - the business cycle shock
and the monetary policy shock - is required, identify the business cycle shock a(1) = A˜q(1)
and identify the monetary policy shock a(2) = A˜q(2) and solve
a = argmina= eAq,Rq=0,q′q(1),q′q(2)=0Ψ(a) (9)
Given the above we can now state our identification restrictions more formally. We
only provide two: the others follow the same pattern.
Definition 2 A business cycle shock impulse vector is an impulse vector a, that
minimizes a criterion function Ψ(a), which penalizes negative impulse responses of GDP,
private consumption, nonresidential investment and government revenue at horizons k =
0, 1, 2, and 3.
Definition 3 A basic government revenue shock impulse vector is an impulse
vector a minimizing a criterion function Ψ(a), which penalizes negative impulse responses
to the vector a of government revenue at horizons k = 0, 1, 2, and 3.
The computations are performed, using a Bayesian approach as in Uhlig (2005),
see also Sims and Zha (1998). We take a number of draws from the posterior. For each
draw from the posterior of the VAR coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix Σ,
the shocks are identified using the criteria described above. Given the sample of draws
for the impulse responses, confidence bands can be plotted.
B The Data
All the data we use is freely available from the World Wide Web. The data on compo-
nents of US national income is taken from the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) which are made publically available by the Bureau of Economic Analysis on
their website http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/uguide.htm. The monetary data, - the interest
rate, producer commodity price index and adjusted reserves - , is taken from the Federal
Reserve Board of St Louis’ website http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/.
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B.1 Definitions of Variables in the VAR
All the components of national income are in real per capita terms and are transformed
from their nominal values by dividing them by the gdp deflator (NIPA table 7.1 Row
4) and the population measure (NIPA table 2.1 Row 35). The table and row numbers
refers to the organization of the data by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
GDP: This is NIPA table 1.1 Row 1.
Private Consumption: This is NIPA table 1.1 Row 1.
Total Government Expenditure: This is ‘Federal Defense Consumption Expendi-
tures’, NIPA table 3.7 Row 4, plus ‘Federal Non Defense Consumption Expendi-
tures’, NIPA table 3.7 Row 15, plus ‘State and Local Consumption Expenditures’,
NIPA table 3.7 Row 28. plus ‘Federal Defense Gross Investment’, NIPA table 3.7
Row 11, plus ‘Federal Non Defense Gross Investment ’, NIPA table 3.7 Row 24,
plus ‘State and Local Gross Investment’, NIPA table 3.7 Row 35.
Total Government Revenue9: This is ‘Total Government Receipts’, NIPA table 3.1
Row 1, minus ‘Net Transfers Payments’, NIPA table 3.1 Row 8, and ‘Net Interest
Paid’, NIPA table 3.1 Row 11.
Private Residential Investment: This is ‘Private Residential Investment, NIPA
table 1.1 Row 11.
Private Non-Residential Investment: This is ‘Nominal Gross Private Domestic
Investment’, NIPA table 1.1 Row 6,.minus private residential investment, NIPA
table 1.1 Row 11.
Interest Rate: This is the Federal Funds rate which is the series fedfunds at the
Federal Reserve Board of St Louis’ website http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/. We take
the arithmetic average of the monthly figures for the Federal Funds Rate.
Adjusted Reserves: This is the Adjusted Monetary Base given by the series adjressl
series at the Federal Reserve Board of St Louis’ website http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/.
We take the arithmetic average of the monthly figures to get a quarterly figure.
9 This definition follows Blanchard and Perotti (1999) in regarding transfer payments as negative
taxes. We use this definition in order not to obscure the implications of the new identification technique
used in this paper, by using different data.
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PPIC: This the Producer Price Index of Crude Materials given by the series ppicrm
at the Federal Reserve Board of St Louis’ website http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/.
We take the arithmetic average of the monthly figures to get a quarterly figure.
The GDP Deflator: This is NIPA table 7.1 Row 4.
The VAR system consists of these 10 variables at quarterly frequency from 1955(Q1)
to 2000(Q4), has 6 lags, no constant or time trend, and uses the logarithm for all variables
except the interest rate where we have used the level.
The fiscal variable are chosen so that they will have different responses to business
cycle movements and fiscal policy shocks. The government expenditure variable is chosen
so as to exclude expenditures which will vary over the business cycle such as transfer
payments, see for example Blanchard (1997) p 600 on this. The government receipts
variable should clearly respond positively to a business cycle shock, an increase in output
should increase tax receipts and reduce transfer payments.
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Figure 1: The business cycle shock ordered first. The shaded areas indicate the impulses
directly restricted by the identification procedure.
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Figure 2: The monetary policy shock ordered second. The shaded areas indicate the
impulses directly restricted by the identification procedure.
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Figure 3: The basic government revenue shock which is ordered third and is where the
government revenue impulses are restricted to be positive for a year after the shock. The
restriction is indicated by the shaded area on the graph.
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Figure 4: The year delayed basic government revenue shock which is ordered third and
is where the government revenue impulses are restricted to be positive for a year after
the shock after a delay of a year. The restriction is indicated by the shaded area on the
graph.
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Figure 5: The basic government expenditure shock which is ordered third and is where
the government expenditure impulses are restricted to be positive for a year after the
shock. The restriction is indicated by the shaded area on the graph.
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Figure 6: The year delayed basic government expenditure shock which is ordered third
and is where the government expenditure impulses are restricted to be positive for a year
after the shock after a delay of a year. The restriction is indicated by the shaded area
on the graph.
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Figure 7: The deficit spending policy shock where government spending is raised by 1%
for four quarters with government revenues remaining unchanged. These impulses are
just a linear combination of a sequence of the basic shocks displayed in Figures 3 and 5.
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Figure 8: The deficit-financed tax cut policy shock where government spending remains
unchanged and government revenue is reduced by 1% for four quarters. These impulses
are just a linear combination of a sequence of the basic shocks displayed in Figures 3 and
5.
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Figure 9: The balanced budget policy shock where government spending is raised by 1%
for four quarters and government revenues raised so that the increased revenue matches
the increased spending. These impulses are just a linear combination of a sequence of
the basic shocks displayed in Figures 3 and 5.
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Figure 10: The present value of the impulses for GDP and the changing fiscal variable
for the deficit spending policy shock and the deficit financed tax cut policy shock which
are displayed in Figures 7 and 8.
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